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Scouting For Approval: Lessons
on Medical Device Regulation in an Era
of Crowdfunding from Scanadu’s “Scout”
Colleen Smith*

I.

Introduction

In November of 2012, Scanadu, an up-and-coming medical device company based in
Mountain View, California, introduced the world to the Scout.1 The Scout is a “hockey
puck-shaped device” that Scanadu says is capable of measuring a multitude of vital signs,
including temperature, heart rate, respiratory rate, and oxygen levels in the blood.2 To
use the Scout, a consumer simply places the Scout to her temple for ten seconds.3 The
Scout collects and sends the measurements to the consumer’s cell phone via Bluetooth
LE, and the information is analyzed and tracked through a companion smartphone
application.4 Scanadu is also developing two accessories for the device: the ScanaFlu,
an influenza tester, and the ScanaFlo, a urinalysis device.5
In May of 2013, to fund the Scout’s commercial development, Scanadu launched a
crowdfunding campaign on Indiegogo,6 one of the world’s most popular crowdfunding
websites.7 Crowdfunding, an increasingly popular method of raising capital, is the
process of raising money for a project, usually via the Internet, by obtaining many small
contributions from a large number of people.8 In just two hours, Scanadu passed its goal

* Colleen Smith is a J.D. candidate, class of 2015, at William & Mary Law School. She plans to practice
food and drug law at Covington & Burling’s Washington, DC office after completing a federal clerkship. This
article was submitted to the 2014 H. Thomas Austern Memorial Writing Competition. It was selected for and
awarded the first place prize for the long paper category.
1
Press Release: Scanadu Aims to Empower Patients with DIY Vital Signs Device, Scanadu (Nov. 29,
2012), http://www.scanadu.com/pr/scanadu-aims-to-empower-patients-with-diy-vital-signs-device/.
2
Matt Brian, Scanadu Scout ‘Medical Tricorder’ for Smartphones Breaks Crowdfunding Record, Verge
(July 23, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/23/4548336/scanadu-scout-health-tracking-smartphoneaccessory-record.
3
Mike Flacy, Scanadu Scout Makes Star Trek’s Medical Tricorder a Reality, Digital Trends (May
23, 2013), http://www.digitaltrends.com/gadgets/scanadu-scout-makes-star-treks-medical-tricorder-areality/#ixzz2l4Fy1hZ0.
4
Id.
5
Jonah Comstock, Scanadu to Crowdfund Its Tricorder Device Pre-FDA Clearance, MobiHealthNews
(May 22, 2013), http://mobihealthnews.com/22516/scanadu-to-crowdfund-its-tricorder-device-pre-fdaclearance/.
6
Brian, supra note 2.
7
Chance Barnett, Donation-Based Crowdfunding Sites: Kickstarter vs. Indiegogo, Forbes (Sept. 9,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2013/09/09/donation-based-crowdfunding-sites-kickstartervs-indiegogo/.
8
Paul Belleflamme, Thomas Lambert & Armin Schwienbacher, Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right
Crowd, 29 J. Bus. Venturing 585, 586 (2014).
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of raising $100,000.9 Over the course of its thirty-day campaign, Scanadu raised—a
then Indiegogo record—$1.66 million from 8,500 contributors.10
Scanadu used the most prevalent crowdfunding model for its campaign: the prepurchase model.11 The pre-purchase model enables contributors to “pre-order” whatever
product the crowdfunder is trying develop for commercial sale in exchange for a financial
contribution.12 In this case, contributors to Scanadu’s campaign “bought” the prototype
of the Scout.13 Scanadu’s campaign site advertised that it expected to ship the prototype
of the Scout to contributors by March of 201414 and hoped to make the Scout available
to the general public in early 2015.15 There is, however, one major hurdle that stands
in Scanadu’s way on its quest to bring the Scout to market: FDA approval.
Scanadu has acknowledged that FDA will need to approve the Scout before it is
made available to the public.16 A company seeking to sell a medical device in the
United States has to obtain FDA approval before it can sell, distribute, or even market
the device.17 To gain approval, Scanadu will have to conduct clinical trials, and those
trials will have to demonstrate the efficacy of the device.18 Scanadu tried to subvert
this requirement and, in violation of FDA regulations, made the prototype of the Scout
available to consumers prior to FDA approval by stating in its crowdfunding campaign
materials that the prototype of the Scout “is not a medical device and makes no medical
claims.” 19 Instead, Scanadu pronounced that the Scout was a “research tool” that “can
be used to collect data that will be submitted in a marketing application to the regulatory
authorities.”20 Scanadu used its crowdfunding campaign not only to raise money, but
also to acquire individuals willing to participate in its clinical trials; Scanadu gave all
campaign contributors who will be receiving the Scout the option to participate in its
trials.21
It should be no surprise that Scanadu turned to crowdfunding as a primary source
of capital. Hundreds of other companies and individual entrepreneurs have done the
same thing over the past few years, many with great success.22 The business world
is utilizing crowdfunding more and more partly because it offers advantages beyond
9
10
11

(2014).

Brian, supra note 2.
Id.
Ethan Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An Exploratory Study, 29 J. Bus. Venturing 1, 3

12
Joachim Hemer, A Snapshot on Crowdfunding 2 (Fraunhofer Inst. for Sys. and Innovation Research
ISI, Working Paper No. R2, 2011).
13

2015).
14

Scanadu Scout, Indiegogo, https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/scanadu-scout (last visited Feb. 18,

Id.
Brian, supra note 2.
16
Scanadu Scout, supra note 13 (explaining in its crowdfunding campaign materials that Scanadu will
“still have to file with the FDA”).
17
See infra Part III.A.
18
See infra Part III.B.
19
Scanadu Scout, supra note 13 (“The exploratory version of the Scanadu Scout™ is not a medical
device and makes no medical claims. It is still in development and can only be used as part of an investigation.
As an investigational product, it can be used to collect certain data and must be used in accordance with the
study’s protocol.”).
20
Scanadu Scout, the First Medical Tricorder, GoBackers, http://www.gobackers.com/projects/
scanadu-scout-the-first-medical-tricorder/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
21
Id.
22
See, e.g., Massolution, 2013CF: The Crowdfunding Industry Report (2013), available at http://
www.crowdsourcing.org/editorial/2013cf-the-crowdfunding-industry-report/25107.
15
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simply providing a cash-strapped company with the means to get off the ground.23 On
average, it costs medical device companies tens of millions of dollars to run clinical
trials and pay for an application for FDA approval.24 Accordingly, the federal regulation
of medical devices functions as an almost insurmountable barrier to market entry;
without a means to enter the U.S. market, innovation is quashed and companies are
driven to countries with easier market entry.25 Crowdfunding can be invaluable to a
small medical device company that is struggling to attract investors, not only because it
provides access to much-needed start-up capital, but also because it offers many other
benefits, including consumer feedback in the early stages of development, which this
Article will later explain.26
Because Internet crowdfunding is a relatively new method of raising capital, there
is limited academic literature on the subject. The majority of legal scholarship on
crowdfunding focuses on the equity model of crowdfunding and its interaction with
federal securities laws.27 As its name implies, using the equity model, “crowdfunders
invest money in order to receive ownership interests in a company.”28 In addition,
past authors have scrutinized medical device regulations and proposed improvements
for their flaws.29 However, this Article’s focus on the interaction of these two subject
areas—medical device regulation and crowdfunding—raises issues novel to the world
of legal literature.
This Article will argue that medical device companies should be able to utilize
crowdfunding to raise the necessary capital to develop a product. However, because of
the risks medical devices pose, any solution that allows medical device companies to
employ crowdfunding should ensure the continuing commitment to consumer safety that
is at the core of FDA regulation. This Article uses the Scanadu Scout as an example and
a staring point for evaluating the use of crowdfunding in the medical device industry.
This Article explains how and why Scanadu broke the law when it moved the Scout, an
“adulterated or misbranded” medical device, through interstate commerce in violation
23
Jenna Wortham, Start-Ups Look to the Crowd, N.Y. Times (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/04/30/technology/kickstarter-sets-off-financing-rush-for-a-watch-not-yet-made.html?.
24
Josh Makower et al., FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Technology Innovation: A Survey of Over
200 Medical Technology Companies 7 (2010), available at http://eucomed.org/uploads/Press%20Releases/
FDA%20impact%20on%20U.S.%20Medical%20Technology%20Innovation.pdf.
25
See Christina Farr, Entrepreneurs Say the FDA Is Killing Medical Innovation, VentureBeat (Apr.
30, 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/04/30/stifled-by-regulation-entrepreneurs-take-life-saving-devicesoverseas/; see also Andrew Pollack, Medical Treatment, Out of Reach, N.Y. Times (Feb. 9, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/02/10/business/10device.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that many companies
are choosing to sell their products in countries such as Mexico, Canada, Brazil, India, China, and all over
Europe, but not the United States, because these countries have less stringent, and thus less expensive, medical
device regulations); Henry I. Miller, U.S. Medical Device Industry in Critical Condition, Forbes (July 24,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/henrymiller/2013/07/24/u-s-medical-device-industry-in-critical-condition/
(“[M]any device firms are shutting down or moving abroad to take advantage of the more favorable tax and
regulatory climate in Europe.”).
26
See infra Part II.A.
27
See, e.g., Stuart R. Cohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution,
64 Fla. L. Rev. 1433 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril:
Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 Tenn. L. Rev. 879 (2011); David Mashburn, Comment,
The Anti-Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act’s Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 Emory
L.J. 127 (2013); John S. Wroldsen, The Social Network and the Crowdfund Act: Zuckerberg, Saverin, and
Venture Capitalists’ Dilution of the Crowd, 15 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 583, 589 (2013).
28
Wroldsen, supra note 27, at 589.
29
See, e.g., Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices:
The Need for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 Health Matrix 441 (2007).
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of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). This Note goes on to explain what this means for other medical
device companies looking to copy Scanadu’s strategy.
Part II of this Article begins with an explanation of crowdfunding, its origins, and a
description of the four different crowdfunding models. Part II also describes the many
benefits of crowdfunding and why the medical device industry would profit from them.
Part III provides some historical context for FDA’s regulation of medical devices
and examines the modern structure of the regulations, including how medical devices
are classified and the different hurdles companies face when trying to bring a medical
device to market.
Part IV first explains how, by giving all campaign contributors the option of
participating in the Scout’s clinical trials, Scanadu created two different groups of
consumers—the non-participants and the participants. Part IV.A analyzes 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(a) and explains how and why Scanadu’s actions, in regard to the non-participants,
were a violation of this code section. Using Scanadu’s strategy as a starting point, this Part
looks at how a medical device company can use crowdfunding legally. Specifically, this
Part explains that if a device company wants to use the pre-purchase model, consumers
should be able to “pre-order” a device prior to FDA approval, but should not be able
to receive the product until after the device has received FDA approval. This section
looks at Biosense, a company that is using this permissible strategy.
Part IV.B analyzes Scanadu’s actions in regard to the group of contributors who
opted to participate in the Scout’s clinical trials. This Part argues FDA should not
give campaign contributors the option to participate in clinical trials as a “perk” for
backing the product, and the investors and test subjects should remain separate. This
Part reasons that permitting the overlap of these two groups creates a moral hazard that
may ultimately affect the safety and efficacy of the device.
Section V argues that FDA should adopt and enforce guidelines for crowdfunding
that reflect the principles outlined in this Article. Additionally, this Part argues that
FDA should promulgate regulations that prevent crowdfunding websites from allowing
medical devices to be crowdfunded using a pre-purchase model without following FDA
guidelines. This Part explains that FDA has limited resources to police medical device
companies while crowdfunding sites have gatekeepers that review every application
to execute a crowdfunding campaign. By adopting this policy, FDA will gain an ally
in its effort to protect consumers.

II.

An Introduction to Crowdfunding

Crowdfunding is a new and exciting way for undercapitalized companies and
individuals to fund their ideas. This Part provides some background on crowdfunding,
explains the four prevalent models of crowdfunding, and explains why, due to the recent
drop in investment in medical device development, crowdfunding is a particularly
attractive option for device companies.
Crowdfunding is the practice of asking for money to fund a specific goal, generally
through a website dedicated to crowdfunding, from anyone who will listen. 30 Individuals
and businesses alike use crowdfunding to raise money for a vast array of things: to
produce a movie, develop a new gadget, or support a charity.31 Although crowdfunding is
not an entirely new concept,32 the advent of websites dedicated to crowdfunding has given
30

Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 586.
Wortham, supra note 23.
32
For more information on the history of crowdfunding, see The History of Crowdfunding, Fundable,
http://www.fundable.com/crowdfunding101/history-of-crowdfunding (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
31
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life to this alternative means of finance.33 An ever-expanding group of entrepreneurs
and charities are utilizing crowdfunding in a vast number of sectors.34 Crowdfunders
worldwide raised $2.7 billion dollars in 2012 through more than 1.1 million campaigns;
this was an 81% increase from 2011.35 This fast-growing trend promises to change how
our society apportions investment capital.36
An individual or company seeking to utilize crowdfunding (“crowdfunder”) must first
have a project or product for which to raise money.37 The crowdfunder then selects one
of the many websites dedicated to crowdfunding,38 also called “CF platforms,” through
which to hold their crowdfunding campaign.39 CF platforms allow crowdfunders to
develop a profile page containing information about the project and its creators, photos,
videos, dates of the campaign, fundraising goal, and the crowdfunding model, including
any rewards for contributing.40 Many CF platforms have an “all-or-nothing” policy
meaning if a campaigner does not reach its stated fundraising goal it does not receive
any of the contributed funds.41 If the campaigner reaches its goal, the CF platform
usually keeps a percentage of the money raised as a fee.42 When the campaign ends,
the funds are transferred directly from contributors’ credit cards to the crowdfunder’s
account.43 Finally, the crowdfunder is obligated to fulfill the rewards, if any, it promised
to contributors.44

A. Why Crowdfund?
Crowdfunding offers benefits that many other forms of financing do not. It is
particularly attractive for small and/or new companies that typically struggle to raise
33
Daniela Castrataro, A Social History of Crowdfunding, Soc. Media Wk. (Dec. 12, 2011), http://
socialmediaweek.org/blog/2011/12/a-social-history-of-crowdfunding/#.Un6NNhZ5nzJ.
34
Ajay K. Agrawal, Christian Catalini & Avi Goldfarb, The Geography of Crowdfunding 4 (2011)
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16820, 2011) (citing Kevin Lawton & Dan Marom,
The Crowdfunding Revolution: Social Networking Meets Venture Financing (2010)), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w16820.pdf.
35
Massolution, supra note 22.
36
See Castrataro, supra note 33; see also Kevin Lawton & Dan Marom, The Crowdfunding Revolution:
Social Networking Meets Venture Financing (2010).
37
Creator Handbook: Getting Started, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/
getting_started (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
38

Individuals or companies can also crowdfund on their own, using their own website or other platform
to garner contributions from a crowd of people. Lawton & Marom, supra note 36.
39
See Hemer, supra note 12, at 15.
40
See Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the Economy?, Forbes (Nov. 27,
2012) http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-and-how-does-it-benefitthe-economy/; see also Creator Handbook: Funding, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/
handbook/funding (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
41
Kickstarter Basics: Kickstarter 101, K ickstarter , http://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/
kickstarter+basics?ref=faq_nav#Kick (last visited Jan. 22, 2014).
42
For example, Kickstarter’s fee is five percent of all money raised in crowdfunding campaigns on its
site, while Indiegogo takes four percent of all money raised. Id.; Fees and Pricing, Indiegogo, http://support.
indiegogo.com/entries/20492953-fees-pricing (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
43
For example, Indiegogo transfers funds into the fundraiser’s PayPal account. Indiegogo Playbook:
After Your Campaign, Indiegogo, https://go.indiegogo.com/playbook/life-cycle-phase/finishing-strong (last
visited Feb. 18, 2015). Kickstarter transfers money into the fundraiser’s Amazon Payments account. Creator
Questions: Getting Started, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/creator+questions (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015).
44
Indiegogo Playbook: After Your Campaign, supra note 43; Creator Handbook: Rewards, Kickstarter,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/handbook/rewards (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
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capital through traditional means.45 Crowdfunding is quickly becoming a main source
of “seed financing” for small entrepreneurs because the process is simple, easy to
understand, and financially safe.46 CF platforms provide an additional advantage for
financially inexperienced entrepreneurs.47 These sites, such as Kickstarter or Indiegogo,
give crowdfunders a platform to sell themselves and their project and provide access
to potential investors.48 Many CF platforms offer other valuable fundraising services
to help crowdfunders run successful campaigns. For example, some sites “give advice,
organize public relations, [and] make arrangements with micro-payment providers.”49
For example, a crowdfunding campaign acts as a good barometer of public interest.50
If there is no market for a product, the campaign will get a minimal number of backers.51
Because this measurement of interest typically comes early in the development of a
project, a campaign that receives little attention or support will “fail quickly,” saving
the developers time and capital.52
A crowdfunding campaign can also perform a marketing function by creating interest
in the project early in its development.53 A campaign that is particularly successful
or unique may also generate media attention.54 All of these aspects of a successful
crowdfunding campaign signal to venture capitalists a startup’s market potential.55
Accordingly, crowdfunding can be a means of obtaining larger amounts of funding later
on through more traditional avenues.56 According to one report, twenty-eight percent of
successful crowdfunders received investments from traditional venture capitalist or angel
investors within three months of completing their campaign.57 GoldieBlox, a toy that
promotes an interest in engineering in girls age four to nine, is a prime example.58 The
makers of GoldieBlox signed an agreement with Toys “R” Us after it raised $280,000
and pre-sold 20,000 toys via its successful Kickstarter campaign.59 Similarly, just a few

45
C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012 Colum. Bus. L. Rev.
1, 27 (2012); Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 586 (“Many entrepreneurial ventures remain unfunded,
partly because of a lack of sufficient value that can be pledged to financial investors and partly because of
unsuccessful attempts to convince investors.” (citations omitted)).
46
Hemer, supra note 12, at 2 (“CF is on the verge of also becoming a substitute seed financing source
for entrepreneurial ventures that have difficulties raising capital from traditional sources like bank loans, angel
capital, VC, state promotion and others because they appear too exotic, too innovative to be understood, too
complex, too crazy, too risky or which are, simply, poorly presented.”).
47
See id. at 10.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Joel A.C. Baum & Brian S. Silverman, Picking Winners or Building Them? Alliance, Intellectual,
and Human Capital as Selection Criteria in Venture Financing and Performance of Biotechnology Startups,
19 J. Bus. Venturing 411, 415 (2004).
56
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
57
Cheryl Conner, New Report: The ROI of Crowdfunding, Forbes (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/01/21/new-report-the-roi-of-crowdfunding/.
58
Alexandros Stefanakis, From Crowd to Retail, Launcht (July 17, 2013), http://www.launcht.com/
blog/2013/07/17/from-crowd-to-retail/.
59
Id.
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months after its wildly successful crowdfunding campaign, Scanadu accrued $10.5
million in Series A60 financing.61
Contributors to crowdfunding campaigns do not just contribute capital to companies;
they can also reduce the cost of product development by giving feedback on design
improvements and consumer preferences.62 In this way, the crowd creates value for the
crowdfunder by providing free labor.63 Crowds are also an efficient way to problemsolve; the “collective intelligence” of crowds creates better solutions to problems than
individuals on their own.64
Finally, crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to obtain financing while allowing
them to retain ownership of their entire company.65 By retaining complete ownership,
entrepreneurs have control over the entire product development process and can
see their vision come to fruition.66 They can accept and incorporate feedback from
contributors, but they are not required to compromise on anything.67 Crowdfunding is
also advantageous because it allows entrepreneurs to choose the crowdfunding model
that suits their product best.

B. Four Models of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding can take one of four forms: the donation model, the lending model,
the equity model, or the reward/pre-purchase model.68 Different crowdfunding platforms
allow different models, each with its own benefits and disadvantages.
The first model, the donation model, is based on the concept of philanthropy.69
Someone who contributes to a campaign based on the donation model expects nothing
in return.70
An entrepreneur using the second model, the lending model, to raise capital asks
contributors to give the campaign a temporary loan.71 At the very least, contributors
expect the entrepreneur to return the money that was loaned.72 Some CF platforms
using the lending model also give contributors a rate of return on their investment.73
Campaigns based on the third model, the equity model, treat contributors like investors
and give “equity stakes or similar consideration” in exchange for a contribution.74 This
model was not permitted in the United States until the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
60
“Series A Financing” is “[t]he first round of financing undergone for a new business venture after
seed capital. Generally, this is the first time that company ownership is offered to external investors.” Series
A Financing, Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seriesa.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
61
Eliza Brooke, Scanadu Closes $10.5M Series A Round, Gearing Up to Send Its Medical Tricorder
Through Clinical Testing, TechCrunch (Nov. 12, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2013/11/12/scanadu-closes10-5m-series-a-round-gearing-up-to-send-its-medical-tricorder-through-clinical-testing/.
62

Armin Schwienbacher & Benjamin Larralde, Crowdfunding of Small Entrepreneurial Ventures, in
The Oxford Handbook of Entrepreneurial Finance 372–74, 379 (Douglas Cumming ed., 2012).
63
See Hemer, supra note 12, at 5.
64
Id. at 5–6.
65
Thomas Elliot Young, The Everything Guide to Crowdfunding: Learn How to Use Social Media
for Small-Business Funding 17 (2013).
66
See id.
67
See id.
68
Bradford, supra note 45, at 14–15; Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
69
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Bradford, supra note 45, at 20–23.
73
Id.
74
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
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Act, passed in April of 2012.75 The equity model is heavily regulated by the SEC and
is rarely used, both inside and outside of the United States.76
Entrepreneurs, who have based their campaign on the forth model, the reward or
pre-purchase model, give contributors a reward for supporting their projects.77 The
reward can take many forms including “naming a character after a backer” or getting
to meet the project creators.78 Most often, crowdfunders give contributors the actual
product that the campaign is funding.79 Crowdfunders regard these individuals as “early
customers” and often give them “access to the products . . . at an earlier date, [a] better
price, or . . . some other special benefit.”80 In essence, this model creates a means of
pre-selling a product81 and, as of 2013, was the most prevalent model.82

C. Restrictions on the Pre-Purchase Crowdfunding Model
Most crowdfunding websites have restrictions on what crowdfunders are allowed
to “pre-sell” in their crowdfunding campaigns.83 Many of these restrictions prevent
campaigns from selling illegal or dangerous items. For example, Indiegogo, the site that
Scanadu used to fund the development of the Scout, states in its terms of service that
crowdfunders cannot offer, among other things, “[f]irearms or weapons”; “[p]rescription
or illegal drugs”; and “[p]ornography or sexually explicit materials.” 84
Some crowdfunding platforms have additional restrictions based not on illegality,
but on consumer protection or the individual preferences and goals of the particular
site. For example, Kickstarter, a crowdfunding website that funds only “projects,”85
lists a host of items that cannot be funded using its site, including drug paraphernalia,
“genetically modified organisms,” and “[a]ny item claiming to cure, treat, or prevent
an illness or condition (whether via a device, app, book, nutritional supplement, or
other means).”86 Because of Kickstarter’s restrictions, Scanadu could not have used
Kickstarter for its crowdfunding campaign.
75
Id. For more information about the equity model and its interaction with the JOBS Act see sources
cited supra note 27.
76
Massolution, supra note 22 (explaining $116 million was raised in 2012 using equity-based
crowdfunding, this is just 0.4% of all crowdfunded money raised worldwide).
77
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
78
Bradford, supra note 45, at 16–17.
79
Id.
80
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3.
81
See id.; see also Hemer, supra note 12, at 14 (“[C]rowdfunding is basically an advance order of a
product and represents a purchasing act.”).
82
Mollick, supra note 11, at 3; see also Belleflamme et al., supra note 8, at 8 n.4 (finding, in a sample
of crowdfunding campaigns, that “43% are based on either profit sharing or pre-ordering, 15% are equity
based, 14% are lending based, and the remainder are donation based”).
83
These crowdfunding sites were used, in part, because they were included on Forbes’s top six
crowdfunding websites. See Kate Taylor, 6 Top Crowdfunding Websites: Which One Is Right for Your Project?,
Forbes (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/katetaylor/2013/08/06/6-top-crowdfunding-websiteswhich-one-is-right-for-your-project/ (listing Kickstarter, Indiegogo, RocketHub, FundRazr, GoGetFunding,
and StartSomeGood as the top six crowdfunding websites).
84
Prohibited Perks, Indiegogo, https://support.indiegogo.com/hc/en-us/articles/204255166 (last visited
Feb. 18, 2015).
85
Our Rules, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules (last visited Feb. 18, 2015).
86
Prohibited Items, Kickstarter, https://www.kickstarter.com/rules/prohibited (last visited Feb. 18,
2015). When Kickstarter’s “Prohibited Items” list was first surveyed during the course of writing this paper,
back in February of 2014, this list included “medical, health, safety, and personal care products.” See Leo Sun,
3 Amazing Medical Technologies Developed on Kickstarter and Indiegogo, Motley Fool (Feb. 14, 2014),
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Kickstarter co-founder Yancey Strickler explained that the company utilizes such
stringent limitations on what projects can be funded through its site because of the
corrupting power of advertising.87 Products typically are not fully developed at the
crowdfunding stage, and Kickstarter wants to discourage crowdfunders from overselling,
or undertaking too much, and trying to figure out how to fulfill the promises later.88
Kickstarter, like most crowdfunding sites, has an “all-or-nothing” policy.89 Kickstarter
has sound reasons for this policy: it motivates people to spread the word about a project
they are excited about, and it creates less risk for everyone because a crowdfunder will
not be expected to complete an expensive project if they only raise a fraction of the
needed funds.90 However, this policy also creates perverse incentives: crowdfunders
may exaggerate the quality or capabilities of their project knowing they will not receive
any money if they do not meet their goal.91
Strickler explained that the consequences of over-advertising are amplified when
it comes to medical devices and products.92 When Kickstarter was created in 2009, it
allowed medical products to be funded through its site.93 Kickstarter only banned medical
devices and products after continually receiving project applications making deceitful
or hyperbolic medical claims.94 Knowing FDA regulates medical products, Kickstarter
now refuses to host crowdfunding campaigns selling them.95 Not all crowdfunding sites
share Strickler’s sentiments. In response to Kickerstarter’s rebuff of medical products,
several healthcare-focused crowdfunding sites launched, including Medstartr, Health
Tech Hatch, and WeFundr.96 These healthcare-specific sites could be advantageous to
the medical device industry, which has recently experienced a downturn in investment.

D. Alternative Sources of Funding for Medical Device
Companies Are Needed
Experts estimate that investment in the medical device industry is down significantly:
2012 saw a thirteen percent decrease in the amount of money spent in the industry from
2011 and a fifteen percent decrease in the number of deals made.97 Even more staggering,
in 2012 the number of “first-time financings” in the medical device industry dropped to
1995 levels.98 Part of what is causing this drop in investment is that it is taking longer
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/02/14/3-amazing-medical-technologies-developed-on-kickst.
aspx#lastVisibleParagraph.
87
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88
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than ever to guide a medical device through the applicable regulations and bring it to
market.99 Michael Carusi, a venture capitalist specializing in biopharmaceuticals and
medical devices, says this is having a detrimental effect on the U.S. medical device
market. “[T]he sad reality,” Carusi said, “is that medical device innovation is being
driven out of the U.S. because of too much regulation.” 100 Investment in medical device
development is also being discouraged in other ways. For example, the Affordable Care
Act contains a provision that imposes a 2.3% excise tax on the revenues made from
medical device sales starting on December 31, 2012.101
Part of FDA’s mission is promoting innovation in the medical device industry.
However, a more fundamental goal of FDA’s is protecting consumer safety. This Note
will now discuss the regulations that advance this objective.

III. Medical Devices and FDA
To fully understand the regulation of medical devices in the United States, it is helpful
to have some background on the roots of FDA and the historical context that gave
rise to the modern system of medical device regulation. This Part explains the current
regulatory scheme and the different paths companies can take to gain FDA approval
of their medical devices.

A. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
The modern system of medical device regulation is largely a result of the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDAs) to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 (FFDCA).102 Before the MDAs, pharmaceutical companies only had to submit
drugs, but not medical devices, for FDA approval prior to putting them on the market.103
The MDAs extended this pre-market approval requirement to medical devices.104
The MDAs were a reaction to the Dalkon Shield disaster.105 The Dalkon Shield was
an intrauterine birth control device marketed in the early 1970s.106 Because FDA did
not have the authority to regulate the Dalkon Shield—as it was a medical device—its
producer never had to demonstrate that it was safe and effective.107 Women who used the
Dalkon Shield suffered from “miscarriages, pelvic inflammatory disease, and unplanned
pregnancies.”108 FDA estimates that the Dalkon Shield affected 200,000 women and
killed at least seventeen.109 The public outcry after this tragedy provoked Congress to
strengthen the regulation of medical devices and ultimately pass the MDAs.110
99
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The MDAs took several steps to clarify FDA’s power and procedures when dealing
with medical devices. First, the MDAs set a definition for “device” that would distinguish
a medical device from both a drug111 and an unregulated product.112 In basic terms,
the MDAs clarified that the distinguishing factor between a medical device and an
unregulated product was whether the manufacturer of the product made any medical
claims.113 As this Note will later discuss, Scanadu tried to evade this definition of
medical device by explicitly saying the Scout made no medical claims. As the case law
has clarified, however, regardless of this statement, the Scout is a medical device.114
Second, the MDAs codified general controls regulating all medical devices.115
Included in these general controls are the requirements that a medical device cannot
be adulterated or misbranded and must meet registering, listing, recordkeeping, import,
and export requirements.116 This Article will later explain how Scanadu failed to follow
these general controls when shipping the Scout because, at the time, the Scout was an
adulterated or misbranded medical device.117
Third, the MDAs defined three classes of medical devices.118 FDA categorizes all
devices into one of these three classes based on the risk that they pose to the public.119
A device’s classification affects what the manufacturer is required to submit to FDA
before the device can be sold to consumers and what regulations the product is subject
to after the product has been put on the market.120
Class I encompasses the lowest risk devices, such as elastic bandages and examination
gloves.121 In most cases, FDA only requires the manufacturer of a Class I medical device
to register it before selling it.122 However, in rare instances, FDA specifically requires
the manufacturer to submit a 510(k), an application for approval,123 before marketing
the Class I device.124 It is also rare for FDA to impose regulations on Class I devices
beyond the general controls: ninety-five percent of Class I devices are exempt from
special regulatory requirements.125
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Class II devices pose a moderate risk, and, accordingly, FDA may subject these
devices to special controls.126 Power wheelchairs and infusion pumps are examples
of Class II devices.127 Most companies seeking to sell a Class II device must submit
a 510(k) to FDA before marketing the device, although FDA has the discretion to
exempt some Class II devices from this requirement.128 FDA has the authority to levy
“device-specific” regulations,129 but generally these special controls include “postmarket
surveillance, patient registries, development and dissemination of guidelines.”130 FDA
currently imposes special controls on fifteen percent of all Class II medical devices.131
A Class III medical device is a device that is “purported or represented to be for a use
in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of substantial importance
in preventing impairment of human health, or presents a potential unreasonable risk of
illness or injury.”132 This class includes heart valves and metal-on-metal hip joints.133 FDA
requires most Class III device manufacturers to obtain Premarket Approval (PMA)134
before the device can be made available to consumers.135
More specifically, FDA requires an approved PMA for three types of Class III devices:
1) devices that are not substantially equivalent to devices that were already on the market
prior to the enactment of the 1976 amendments; 2) devices that are required by federal
regulation (listed in 21 C.F.R.) to provide a PMA; and 3) all “new” devices that are
not substantially equivalent to any device currently on the market.136 All other Class
III devices may be approved using a 510(k).137 When a new device enters the market,
FDA automatically categorizes it as a Class III device.138 In order to avoid having to
obtain a PMA, a manufacturer of a new device may petition FDA to have the device
reclassified as a Class I or Class II device.139
The Scout is a brand new device. Nothing like it has ever been made before. In fact,
Scanadu is in the running for the Qualcomm X-Prize,140 a competition to build the
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first “Medical Tricorder,”141 the winner of which will receive a $10 million prize.142
Given this novelty, the Scout was a Class III device when it held its crowdfunding
campaign. As a Class III device, Scanadu was required to submit the Scout for PMA
or for reclassification before introducing the Scout into interstate commerce. Scanadu
did neither. FDA also did nothing to stop Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign or the
initial shipment to contributors.

B. Different Paths to the Market
As mentioned above, FDA requires a company seeking to bring a medical device
to market to go through different processes depending on the risk the device poses.
Generally, the more risk the device poses, the more rigorous the approval process.
This Part will provide a brief explanation of the different paths to market, which will
provide some background on the options and responsibilities Scanadu had when first
contemplating bringing the Scout to market.

1. The 510(k)
A 510(k), named after the applicable section of the FFDCA, is the conduit that
most manufacturers of Class II devices use to get their product to market.143 Through
a 510(k), the manufacturer must show that its product is substantially equivalent to a
device already on the market that statutorily does not require a PMA.144 A device meets
the requirements of substantial equivalence if it is shown to be “as safe and effective as
the predicate device(s).”145 The goal of a 510(k) is to show that “the device performs in a
similar fashion to the predicate [device] under a similar set of circumstances.”146 Clinical
studies are not usually required to establish this.147 Besides providing information
about the device’s performance under specific conditions, a standard 510(k) includes
information about the device’s design, components, packaging, and labeling.148
Though far less rigorous than a PMA, the development of a 510(k) can still be quite
expensive. A Stanford study found that the average cost of bringing a “low-to-moderaterisk 510(k) product from concept to clearance was approximately $31 million, with $24
million spent on FDA dependent and/or related activities.”149 In addition, FDA requires
a $5,018 fee for the review of a 510(k).150
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2. Premarket Approval
FDA requires all companies seeking to sell a new or exceptionally risky device to
first obtain PMA,151 an arduous task.152 “The FDA spends an average of 1,200 hours
reviewing each application,” which usually consists of multiple volumes of reports,
descriptions of methods used, lists of component parts, manufacturing processes, and
label specimens.153 The standard PMA fee for fiscal year 2014 is $258,502.154 But this
fee is miniscule compared to the overall costs of developing a product and meeting all
of the testing specifications. A Stanford study estimates that it costs on average $94
million to bring a Class III device requiring PMA to market, with $75 million of that
going towards meeting FDA requirements.155 Companies spend a large portion of this
money on clinical trials, which present an additional set of regulations; most notably,
companies must obtain preliminary approval, also known as an Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE).

3. Investigational Device Exemption
A medical device manufacturer must obtain an IDE before shipping the device
to clinical study participants.156 The IDE fixes the PMA’s “catch-22”; without this
exception, companies could not ship the device across state lines for use in the clinical
trials, which are required in order to obtain final approval.157
There are different requirements a company must meet when applying for an IDE,
depending on the level of risk posed by the medical device being tested.158 After obtaining
an IDE, a manufacturer can lawfully ship a device for use in its clinical studies without
complying “with other requirements of the FFDCA, such as registration and listing.”159
As this Note will discuss later, Scanadu did not obtain an IDE before launching its
crowdfunding campaign and promising contributors the opportunity to participate in its
clinical trials. Even if it had, however, Scanadu’s strategy of obtaining its test subjects
through its crowdfunding campaign poses a moral hazard that FDA should address.

IV. Scanadu Contravened FDA Regulations
In selling the Scout through its crowdfunding campaign, Scanadu evaded all of the
detailed regulations explained above that were designed specifically to protect the health
and safety of consumers. This Part will explain which specific regulations Scanadu
contravened and how Scanadu’s actions are directly in conflict with the overall purpose
and mission of FDA.
Scanadu planned to ship its prototype of the Scout to thousands of its crowdfunding
campaign donors in March of 2014.160 At that time, Scanadu had not yet received—or
151
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even applied for—FDA approval.161 Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign created two
groups of contributors: those who opted to participate in the Scout’s clinical trials
(participants) and those who did not (non-participants).162 Each group poses separate
and unique legal issues that will be addressed in turn.

A. The Non-Participants
Scanadu’s actions in regards to the non-participants poses a legal issue because,
in shipping the Scout to this group, Scanadu moved an “adulterated or misbranded”
medical device in interstate commerce as prohibited by the FFDCA.163 To establish
a violation of this statute, which is codified at 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), the Government
must show three things: (1) the product is a “device” as defined in the FFDCA; (2) the
product is an “adulterated or misbranded” device; and (3) the product moved in interstate
commerce.164 Under the FFDCA, a medical device is adulterated if “it is required to
receive premarket approval from the FDA but moves in commerce even though it did
not receive premarket approval.”165
In plain language, it is a violation of the FFDCA to sell an unapproved Class III
medical device to someone in another state.166 That is exactly what Scanadu did when
it held its crowdfunding campaign and sold the Scout to consumers who would not opt
to participate in the clinical trials. The following three subsections elaborate on how
Scanadu’s actions meet the elements for a violation of this statute.

1.

The Scout Is a Medical Device

The Scout is unquestionably a medical device as defined by the FFDCA. Scanadu tried
to sidestep FDA regulation by calling the Scout a “research tool” instead of a medical
device.167 The Scout’s crowdfunding campaign rhetoric laid the foundation for avoiding
the regulation: “We are creating a medical-grade device, which is not yet fully accurate
and not FDA-approved. Hence this is not a medical device . . . and makes no medical
claims.”168 Scanadu further asserted that “[a]s a research tool, the product will not pose
any risk to users and can be used to collect, store and display all your information, but
without making specific disease diagnosis.”169
This linguistic manipulation should not automatically free Scanadu from the purview
of FDA regulatory scheme. The plain language of the regulation, the case law interpreting
the statute, and the purpose and goals of FDA’s regulations demonstrate why the Scout
is a medical device and why Scanadu should not be able to evade FDA by calling the
Scout a “research tool.”
While saying that the Scout makes no “medical claims,” Scanadu also maintains that
it measures body temperature, blood pressure, heart rate, and more. All of the traditional
devices that measure these same vital signs—a thermometer,170 a sphygmomanometer,171
161

Id.
Id.
163
United States v. Endotec, Inc., 563 F.3d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir. 2009).
164
United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 191 F.3d 750, 754 (6th Cir. 1999).
165
563 F.3d at 1190.
166
Id.
167
Scanadu Scout, supra note 13.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
21 C.F.R. § 880.2920 (2014).
171
Id. § 870.1120.
162

224

Food and Drug Law Journal

Vol. 70

even a stethoscope172—are all considered medical devices. The FFDCA defines “device”
as an instrument “intended for use in the diagnosis . . . cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease.”173 The factor courts consider most determinative of whether a
product is a device is the “objective intent” of the product manufacturer:
[T]he intent is determined by such persons’ expressions or may be shown by the
circumstances surrounding the distribution of the article. This objective intent may, for
example, be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements
by such persons or their representatives. It may be shown by the circumstances that the
article is, with the knowledge of such persons or their representatives, offered and used
for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor advertised.174
Because intent is the dispositive factor, whether the product actually diagnoses or
treats a disease or condition has no affect on whether the product is subject to medical
device regulations.175
In determining a manufacturer’s intent, FDA is not constrained by the manufacturer’s
claim that its product is not a medical device.176 The District of Minnesota spoke directly
to this principle in United States v. Sybaritic, Inc.177 In Sybaritic, FDA had issued a
cessation order, demanding that the defendant, Sybaritic, Inc., stop selling its products
because they were medical devices under the FFDCA and had not been approved for
sale under the applicable FDA regulations.178 Sybaritic argued that their products were
not medical devices and thus did not have to comply with the regulations.179
In analyzing whether the products were medical devices, the Sybaritic court
considered the “intended use of the product as determined from its label, accompanying
labeling, promotional claims, advertising, and any other relevant source, including
consumer intent.”180 The advertising promoting the defendants’ products clearly stated
that the products helped with weight loss, scar reductions, and wrinkle reduction.181
The court found these health-related claims put the products squarely within the federal
definition of medical device.182 The defendant’s bald contention that it was not selling
medical devices nor making medical claims had no effect on the court’s decision.183
FDA and federal courts have consistently held that the intent of the manufacturer
and the consumer in purchasing and using the product is the critical factor in whether
a product is considered a medical device.184 Even when the product is unconventional,
when the medical claims are not based off of modern science, or when the medical
172
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claims seem implausible, courts look at what manufacturers intend consumers to use
the product for.185
The plaintiffs in Holistic Candlers and Consumer Association v. U.S. Food and
Drug Administration disputed FDA’s determination that the plaintiffs’ ear candles were
medical devices.186 Ear candles are fabric cones dipped in wax that are “intended to
remove excess ear wax.”187 Consumers are instructed to place one end of the candle
in their ear and light the other end on fire; as it burns, the candle creates a vacuum to
draw wax and other impurities from the ear.188
The ear candle manufacturers claimed the ear candles were not medical devices
but rather a “natural holistic modality . . . intended to be used for relaxation, comfort,
reduction of stress and for the natural furtherance of the well-being of the user.”189
Defendants provided affidavits from consumers testifying that they use ear candles
only for relaxation and not for medical purposes.190 The ear candle manufacturers,
however, had advertised the products as improving “sinus congestion, colds, the flu, sore
throats, earaches, ear infections, sinus infections, lymphatic congestion, [and] swollen
glands.”191 FDA had determined these were medical claims and advised the ear candle
manufacturer that they must cease selling the devices or remove the medical claims
from all advertisements and labels.192
Federal courts have also held that “labels of disclaimer are not controlling, but are
to be considered together with any extrinsic evidence of the device’s intended use.”193
The Ninth Circuit, in Church of Scientology of California v. Richardson, affirmed a
district court determination that the “Hubbard E-meter” was a medical device subject
to FDA regulations.194 The Hubbard E-meter is a “simple skin galvanometer that
crudely measures changes in electrical resistance in the human body.”195 The Church
of Scientology argued that the Hubbard E-meters were “not misbranded because they
bear declamatory labels”; the E-meters were marked with the warning: “Not intended
or effective for the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of any disease.”196 The court
concluded that these disclaimers held no weight in determining whether the products
185
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were adulterated medical devices because there was clear evidence that the E-meters
were intended for medical use.197 The skin galvanometers measured “skin voltage
by means of surface skin electrodes”198 and were “used as tools in psychoanalysis,
hypnotherapy, biofeedback, and behavior therapy.”199
Although the Scout is far more technologically sophisticated that the Hubbard
E-meter, the two products are the same in several respects. Like the Scout, the E-meters
did not directly treat a condition, but rather measured some physical phenomenon
occurring in the human body. The only possible purpose of the E-meter’s measurements
was medical in nature; no disclaimer could nullify this fact. The Scout similarly takes
measurements that are undoubtedly for medical use. Therefore, Scanadu’s assertion
that the Scout makes no medical claims should be rejected.
In Church of Scientology, the Ninth Circuit made several other important points. First,
the court disregarded the defendant’s admission that the E-meters were “ineffective for
any medical therapeutic purpose.”200 A product does not escape the definition of medical
device simply because it is ineffective.201 Second, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that the E-meters could not cause harm to any user.202 The court analogized the
E-meter to the product at issue in Drown v. United States, the “Drown Radio Therapeutic
Instrument.”203 The maker of the Drown Radio Therapeutic Instrument made many
fantastical claims including that the device could cure breast cancer, treat “cirrhosis
and carcinoma of the right kidney,” and “prevent loss of speech and memory.”204 In
Drown, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]hile the instruments may be harmless in
themselves, their danger lies in the possibility that ‘ignorant and gullible persons are
likely to rely upon them instead of seeking professional advice for conditions they are
represented to relieve or prevent.’”205 This point made by the Drown court summarizes
why even a relatively benign device still needs to conform to FDA regulations.
Scanadu’s non-participating contributors are the exact “ignorant and gullible” people
the Drown court was speaking about. The Scout purports to measure vital signs and it
is likely that consumers intend to use the Scout to do just that. In fact, that is the only
thing the Scout could be used for. If the Scout is not accurate or malfunctions, these
consumers will be put at risk.
Scanadu might have wanted to tap into one of crowdfunding’s most valuable
resources—consumer feedback on a large-scale—before having to comply with FDA
regulations. However, altering a medical device requires a second round of tests and
197
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applications for approval,206 and Scanadu likely sought to avoid the costs of having to
go through the approval process multiple times. FDA does not allow purely consumer
focused feedback on medical devices prior to approval because of the risks those devices
pose.207 Calling a product a “research tool” instead of a medical device does not negate
the potential risk. Consumers who receive the Scout will undoubtedly use the device
and use it for its clearly intended medical purpose. The Scout, therefore, falls squarely
within the definition of medical device.
It is critical to acknowledge that the Scout is not simply a “research device” because
medical devices—but not research devices—are required to undergo testing during which
potential harmful side effects or defects can be spotted and prevented. The Thalidomide
crisis can lend some insight into the possible consequences of skipping over this critical
step when developing an experimental product like the Scout.
Chemie Grünenthal, a German company, invented Thalidomide and began selling it
on the German market in 1957.208 Chemie Grünenthal sold Thalidomide to RichardsonMerrell, through its principal, Vicks Chemical Company, in 1958.209 Richardson-Merrell
planned to sell the drug on the U.S. market as a sedative and as an anti-nausea medication
to be taken during pregnancy.210 The FFDCA at the time allowed pharmaceutical
companies to distribute unapproved drugs to a limited number of “qualified experts”
on the condition “that the drug was labeled as being under investigation.”211 Merrel
shipped Thalidomide samples to 1,267 doctors for experimental use in early 1960, seven
months before it sent its application to FDA seeking to officially market the drug.212
FDA denied the application and made specific demands on the company to provide
more data showing the drug was safe and effective, specifically in pregnant women.213
In November 1961, news broke in Europe of the severe birth defects that Thalidomide
caused in babies whose mothers took the drug while pregnant.214 Chemie Grünenthal
quickly took the drug off the market, but the drug had already been on the market for
four years with devastating results: an estimated 8,000 babies were born in European
countries with severe deformities because of the drug, while several thousand more
died in the womb.215 FDA estimates there were about forty cases in the United States,
all from Merrell’s experimental release of the drug.216
The Thalidomide crisis is just one example of what can happen when a medical
product is released for a limited use prior to regulatory approval. The current regulations
206
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were intended to prevent these types of disasters, but the regulations carry no weight
if they are not followed in all applicable circumstances. The Scout may seem like an
innocuous device, but that, in itself, is not a good reason to exempt the Scout from
premarket regulation. By going through the statutorily proscribed vetting process,
FDA can ensure the Scout is safe, accurate, and does not present other hidden risks
for consumers.

2. The Scout Is an “Adulterated or Misbranded” Device
When Scanadu held its crowdfunding campaign, and subsequently shipped the device
to its contributors, the Scout was not only a medical device, but also an “adulterated
device” moving in interstate commerce, which is a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).217 A
device is adulterated under the FFDCA if “it is required to receive premarket approval
. . . from the FDA but moves in commerce even though it did not receive this PMA.”218
Recall that the Scout is a Class III device requiring PMA because the Scout is a new
device that has not been reclassified.219

3. The Crowdfunding Campaign Introduced the Scout
into Interstate Commerce
By raising money through a reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding campaign model,
Scanadu put the Scout into interstate commerce for commercial distribution. When the
Scout was shipped to contributors, there was no doubt that Scanadu had introduced the
device into interstate commerce. But the Scout was introduced into interstate commerce
even before that. The crowdfunding campaign in itself introduced the device into
interstate commerce, and thus was a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign advertised the Scout to thousands of consumers
over the Internet. These consumers were located all across the nation and around the
world. When a contributor made a contribution to the campaign through Indiegogo,
the contributors’ credit cards or PayPal accounts were charged immediately after the
checkout process was completed.220 When the campaign reached its goal, Scanadu was
“legally bound to perform on any promise and/or commitment to Contributors (including
delivering any Perks).”221 A crowdfunder which cannot fulfill its promised perks must
negotiate a “mutually satisfactory resolution” with contributors, “which may include
refunding their Contributions.”222
In other words, when a crowdfunder offers a product as a “perk” on a campaign
page, and the contributor gives the designated amount needed to receive that perk, the
crowdfunder and the contributor have entered into a contract. During the execution of
the contract, the contribution is transferred across state lines and thus through interstate
commerce.
The reward/pre-purchase model can also be framed as a donation. Indeed, many CF
platforms describe the interaction between contributor and crowdfunder as a charitable
donation. Indiegogo calls any product offered in exchange for a contribution a “perk”223;
217
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Kickstarter calls them “rewards.”224 But many crowdfunders on both sites, and many
others, refer to their campaigns as a means to pre-order their product, album, or film.225
The academic literature also describes this crowdfunding model as a way of “preordering” or “pre-selling” a product.226
While Scanadu never used the terms “pre-order” or “buy” on its campaign page,
other language indicates Scanadu intended for the campaign to be a pre-ordering
mechanism. For example, as the donation increased, the contributor was able to benefit
from economies of scale: if the contributor gave $756 she would receive four Scouts,
meaning each would “cost[ ] $189 instead of $199.”227 This explicit language used by
Scanadu indicates an intention to sell the Scout through its crowdfunding campaign.
To make a donation, a “donor must transfer an ownership interest to the donee without
consideration and with donative intent.”228 The Scanadu campaign contributions do not
meet this definition because they were given in exchange for consideration: the obligation
to deliver the Scouts or return the money. The contributions to Scanadu’s crowdfunding
campaign, then, are not donations but rather contracts for sale.229 These contracts were
executed during the crowdfunding campaign and resulted in transfers of money across
state lines. Scanadu, therefore, introduced the Scout into interstate commerce.
Scanadu’s actions satisfy all three elements of a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a).
The Scout is a “device” as defined in the FFDCA, and the Scout required PMA before
being introduced into interstate commerce, yet Scanadu introduced it into interstate
commerce without obtaining clearance.230 This decision, to make the Scout available
to consumers without any level of review by FDA, by definition put consumers at risk.
Other medical device companies that are planning on using crowdfunding should realize
and understand this reality.
Scanadu is just one example of a medical device company using crowdfunding. As
crowdfunding continues to increase in popularity, more companies that are seeking to
sell medical devices, devices that are potentially far more dangerous than the Scout,
could use the pre-purchase model to distribute those devices to imprudent consumers.
If successful, this strategy undermines FDA medical device regulatory scheme and
causes undue risk.
Scanadu is not the only medical device company that has used crowdfunding to raise
money pre-FDA approval. Biosense, the maker of the uChek, is following Scanadu’s
crowdfunding strategy.231 The “uChek Universal” is a “mobile urinalysis system” that
uses a smartphone camera to analyze urine dipsticks.232 The uChek Universal system
provides information about ten different analytes present in the tested urine. 233 This
224
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information, which is presented and analyzed through the uChek smartphone app, can
be used to diagnose and monitor a variety of conditions including diabetes and “many
bladder, liver and kidney disorders.”234
Interestingly, Biosense tried to put the uChek Universal on the market in April of
2013 and was admonished by FDA for doing so prior to obtaining FDA approval.235
Biosense registered its smartphone application on April 5, 2013, and sold its first device
in the United States on April 28, 2013.236 FDA sent Biosense a warning letter on May
21, 2013, informing the company that it would have to obtain FDA clearance for the
uChek system before making it available to consumers.237 Biosense took the uChek
off the market and turned to the crowd to gain the necessary funds to apply for FDA
approval.238 Biosense also negotiated with FDA and the two were able to come up with a
compromise: FDA agreed to allow Biosense to sell the “uChek Lite,” but not the uChek
Universal, without first obtaining FDA clearance.239 The difference between the uChek
Lite and the uChek Universal is the uChek Lite does not measure blood or glucose.240
Biosense is still working toward obtaining clearance for the uChek Universal and
has launched an Indiegogo campaign to help it do so.241 The Indiegogo campaign gives
contributors the option of purchasing the “uChek Original” for $25, the uCheck Universal
for $84, and many multi-pack options.242 The campaign also informed contributors that
“[a]ll uChek devices would ship after CE243 and FDA clearances.”244 The vital difference
between the crowdfunding campaigns associated with the Scout and the uChek is the
fact that Scanadu shipped the Scout to consumers before receiving FDA approval, while
Biosense waited to ship the uChek until after FDA approved it. Biosense’s solution,
however, did not address an additional problem Scanadu’s crowdfunding strategy poses:
whether campaign contributors should participate in pre-market clinical trials.

B. The Participants
Scanadu’s interactions with the contributors who opted to participate in the Scout’s
clinical trials pose another issue in addition to the violation for introducing adulterated
devices into interstate commerce.245 Allowing backers of a crowdfunded medical device
234
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to become subjects in the device’s clinical trials creates the type of conflict of interest
that FDA avidly works to avoid.246 Considering the potential for bias and the many
alterative methods for obtaining test subjects, FDA should prohibit this practice.
A device company is usually required to obtain an IDE from FDA before conducting
its clinical trials.247 Scanadu failed to obtain an IDE before launching its crowdfunding
campaign and promising contributors the opportunity to participate in the clinical trials.
Even if Scanadu had obtained regulatory approval, FDA should prohibit these trials
because of the potential conflict of interest they pose.

1. Scanadu Should Have Obtained an IDE
for Its Clinical Trial Participants
As mentioned before, an IDE allows a company to ship a Class III medical device
in interstate commerce before receiving PMA in order “to obtain the test data needed
for approval.”248 The IDE provides strict guidelines that must be met during the clinical
trials to ensure the continued safety of the user.249 The IDE allows the shipment of
unapproved devices only to “experts qualified by scientific training and experience.”250
More specifically, under the IDE, the “device has to be shipped . . . to physicians who
will test the device in patients under controlled circumstances.”251
Rather than shipping the device to experts or physicians, Scanadu is shipping the
Scout directly to patients who could use the device for other purposes outside of the
clinical studies.252 Knowing this information, it is hard to see how the Scout is being
shipped for purely investigational purposes or meeting the IDE requirements. Scanadu
also missed one very important procedural requirement: a company wishing to obtain
an IDE typically must apply for and obtain the IDE before “enrolling patients at the
study site.”253
The IDE guidelines require different levels of precautions based on a particular
device’s level of risk. A company developing a “significant risk device” must obtain
an IDE from FDA and must have every one of the sites at which it plans to conduct
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clinical studies approved by an institutional review board (IRB).254 “Nonsignificant risk
devices,” on the other hand, do not require an IDE from FDA, but rather must obtain
approval only from an IRB.255 Diagnostic devices are exempt from obtaining an IDE
from FDA altogether, if the testing:
1. is noninvasive;
2. does not require an invasive sampling procedure that presents significant risk;
3. does not by design or intention introduce energy into a subject; and
4. is not used as a diagnostic procedure without confirmation by another medically
established diagnostic product or procedure.256
Because it is intended to measure vital signs, the Scout would probably be classified
as a diagnostic device. So long as other medically established devices confirmed the
Scout’s readings during the clinical trials, Scanadu might not have needed an IDE before
conducting its clinical trials.

2. Crowdfunding Campaign Contributors Should Not Be Allowed
to Participate in the Crowdfunded Device’s Clinical Trials
The intricate details of Scanadu’s clinical trials and whether they conform to
FDA’s IDE requirements are not clear. But for any type of device, diagnostic or not,
significantly risky or not, an IDE is a way to get a device into the hands of consumers
and obtain feedback during the development process legally, while still conforming
with FDA regulations. But allowing individuals who have purchased a device through
a crowdfunding campaign to then participate in the clinical trials for that device poses
a different issue, one that FDA has not had to address before.
FDA allows medical device and pharmaceutical companies to advertise clinical
trials directly to consumers.257 “[A]dvertising that is intended to be seen or heard by
prospective subjects to solicit their participation in a study, is not in and of itself, an
objectionable practice.”258 FDA, however, has explicitly excluded several things from
the definition of acceptable direct advertising, including “(1) communications intended
to be seen or heard by health professionals . . . (2) news stories[,] and (3) publicity
intended for other audiences, such as financial page advertisements directed toward
prospective investors.”259 Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign is very similar in substance
to this third prohibited item.
This prohibition against advertising clinical trials to prospective investors reflects
FDA’s unease with mixing clinical trials with financial interests. In addition, FDA
requires individuals involved in the clinical trials process who have a financial stake in
the trials to fully disclose their financial interest.260 Specifically, 21 C.F.R. § 54 requires
companies seeking approval of their medical device to disclose any financial interest
held by clinical investigators who are conducting clinical trials for the market approval
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application.261 FDA adopted this regulation out of concern that a financial investment
could “affect the reliability of data submitted to FDA.”262
FDA does not require disclosures of financial interests held by test subjects in clinical
trials. Investigators and test subjects, admittedly, are in very different positions with
different levels of control over the data that is produced during a clinical trial. However,
FDA’s concern about potential bias runs deep, and 21 C.F.R. § 54 casts a wide net to
capture any possible prejudice.263 The regulation requires that the applicant must identify
not only every clinical investigator and their financial interest, but also “the spouse and
each dependent child of the investigator or subinvestigator.”264 If an applicant fails to
provide this information, FDA may refuse to file the application altogether.265
It would be infeasible to require applicants for FDA approval to provide this
information for every single subject of a clinical study, as thousands of individuals
will participate.266 If only a few subjects in a clinical trial held a financial interest in
the product, or in the sponsor of the study, it is unlikely that the data would be skewed.
This assurance of impartiality begins to disappear, however, when large percentages
of the subjects have an interest. This could be the result if the subjects are obtained
through a crowdfunding campaign.
Considering the expansive scope of the disclosures FDA requires clinical investigators
to make, it seems FDA wants to quash any chance of bias. Although the bias of the
crowdfunder who is a subject in a clinical trial may be small, it is at least considerable
enough that crowdfunders that have backed a medical device should be prevented from
participating in the clinical trials. Many different things motivate individuals in their
decision to contribute to a crowdfunding campaign.267 In the context of the pre-purchase
model, many backers are motivated to contribute because they will receive a product in
return for their contribution.268 Many funders are also motivated, however, to contribute
to “ideas and businesses [they] believe in.”269
The contributors to the Scanadu Scout campaign were not given the option to
participate in the clinical trials until after they had received the Scout.270 At that point,
the decision to support Scanadu’s work was no longer motivated by the desire to
261
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receive the product. The contributors opting into the trials were motivated by something
else, perhaps the desire to see the company and the product succeed. A crowdfunding
campaign contributor is very similar to an investor. In the case of a medical device, the
device will not be made available to the public at large unless the device is successful
in the clinical trials. Contributors opting to be test subjects could be motivated by the
desire to see the product reach the shelves or the desire to know that they made a good
investment.
While the motivation of backers is unclear, the chance for prejudice is certain. To avoid
this possibility, FDA should not allow medical device or pharmaceutical companies to
solicit clinical trial subjects through a crowdfunding campaign. There are many other
methods of direct advertising a company can use to obtain participants, so this policy
should not create an unfair burden.

V.

Enforcement

Crowdfunding is an effective strategy for raising capital and device companies should
be able to use it, with some restrictions. Scanadu’s crowdfunding campaign for the Scout
highlights some of the areas where crowdfunding is at odds with FDA regulations. By
making the Scout available to consumers before FDA cleared it, Scanadu violated an
essential FDA regulation. If FDA does nothing to enforce the regulation, it will set a
precedent whereby other companies will try to follow the Scanadu crowdfunding model,
putting more consumers at risk.
FDA needs to review the risks posed by the pre-purchase crowdfunding campaign
model and issue guidance to help companies comply with the regulations while still
allowing them to take advantage of the benefits of crowdfunding. At the heart of these
guidelines should be the option for device companies to “pre-sell” their device if the
company makes it clear to contributors that they will not receive the product unless
FDA has fully approved it. This is the strategy Biosense used.271 This solution allows
companies to benefit from the most popular and effective crowdfunding model, the prepurchase model, while ensuring that consumers are not purchasing adulterated devices.
In addition, FDA should prohibit device companies from giving backers the option
to participate in clinical trials as a “perk.” Allowing the overlap of these two groups
creates a moral hazard that may ultimately affect the safety and efficacy of the device.
Considering the large number of clinical trial subjects, it would be infeasible to mitigate
the potential bias that might result if this was allowed. Thus, it should not be an option
at all.
Finally, FDA should promulgate a regulation that prevents CF platforms from allowing
medical devices to be crowdfunded using a pre-purchase model without following
the applicable FDA guidelines. CF platforms differ widely in their policies about
crowdfunding medical devices.272 Under the proposed regulation, sites like Indiegogo
would have to carefully screen companies looking to crowdfund a medical device.
FDA has limited resources to police market activities like crowdfunding campaigns.
By adopting regulations that impart liability on CF platforms, FDA will gain an ally in
its effort to protect consumers.
CF platforms are not experts in FDA regulations, but their ability to screen unlawful
campaigns is evidenced by their detailed terms and conditions. If need be, crowdfunding
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See supra Part IV.A.3.
For example, Kickstarter does not allow anyone to use its site to fund the development of a medical
product. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. Indiegogo, on the other hand, permits many medical
device companies to use its platform. See supra Part II.B.
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websites could charge medical device companies a higher percentage of the funds raised
in their campaigns to pay for the extra level of review.273 This regulation will help keep
device companies and crowdfunding websites cognizant of, and accountable for, the
potential risks created when medical devices are made available to consumers before
they have been properly tested. These regulations could lead all-purpose CF platforms
to forbid medical device companies from using their services. This will force device
companies wishing to utilize crowdfunding to do so via their own websites, or through
healthcare-specific CF platforms that, because of their focus, will be better equipped
to screen unlawful campaigns.

VI. Conclusion
FDA’s mission is both to protect consumers and advance innovation. If properly
regulated, crowdfunding could help achieve both of these goals. While there has
been a drop in medical device investment, companies in all sectors are increasingly
using crowdfunding as a means to raise start-up capital. Thus, if used appropriately,
crowdfunding could bring a new wave of investment to the medical device industry.
Using Scanadu as an example, this Article has shown that crowdfunding medical
devices can pose a host of regulatory issues that FDA needs to be aware of. Medical
device companies should be able to use the pre-purchase model, but should not be
able to ship a device to consumers before FDA has approved it. The Scout seems like a
relatively harmless device, but by requiring all new devices to receive approval, FDA can
help ensure the continued safety of consumers. In addition, medical device companies
should not be able to obtain their clinical trial participants through their crowdfunding
campaign. Clinical trials are an important step in gaining FDA approval, but their power
lies in providing untainted data on the safety and efficacy of a device. To maintain the
purity of clinical studies, FDA should disallow those who have a conflict of interest,
like crowdfunding campaign contributors, from being test subjects. In this way, FDA
can stimulate investment and innovation in the medical device field while continuing
to protect consumers.
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For example, Indiegogo collects four percent of the total amount raised if a crowdfunder exceeds
its goal; if the crowdfunder does not meet its goal Indiegogo collects nine percent of the total amount raised.
Fees and Pricing, Indiegogo, http://support.indiegogo.com/entries/20492953-fees-pricing (last visited Feb.
18, 2015).

